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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
questions of fact. The court found no reason to .disturb the con-
clusions reached by the trial courts.
SUCCESSIONS, DONATIONS AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Harriet S. Daggett*
In the Succession of Combre,1 since decedent and his family
had continued in possession after an act of sale reciting a cash
consideration, the presumption of simulation placed the burden of
proof upon the alleged vendee to show that consideration had
been paid. Since this burden was not sustained, the administrator
of the succession secured the annulment of the act of sale.
In the Succession of Montegut2 the will of Amelie Montegut
contained a clause of doubtful meaning; and after consideration
by the supreme court, the case was remanded in order that evi-
dence might be heard bearing upon the intention of the testatrix.3
It was indicated that a presumption prevails that a testator intends
to dispose of all property. When this case again reached the su-
preme court, the majority took the position that this presumption
is not as strong in the jurisprudence as is the preference in case
of ambiguity for following as closely as possible the legal order
of distribution. Upon rehearing the court adhered to the judg-
ment on first hearing after the remand, particularly since the
extrinsic evidence adduced did not convincingly -disclose the
intention of the testatrix.
In Gregory v. Hardwick4 a testatrix made the following
bequest: "I hereby will and bequeath all the rights, title and
interest which I may have in any property whatsoever in equal
proportions, share and share alike to" four named persons. The
court found this provision to be a universal legacy under Article
1606 and Shane and Withers v. Withers' Legatees,5 rather than a
legacy under universal title. Thus, seizin was given to these
legatees under Articles 1609 and 884, and they had a right of
action for an accounting and other relief against decedent's hus-
band. Moreover, the testamentary executrix, one of the legatees,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 955, 47 So. 2d 734 (1950).
2. 217 La. 1023, 47 So. 2d 898 (1949) (rehearing 1950).
3. Succession of Montegut, 211 La. 112, 29 So. 2d 583 (1947).
4. 218 La. 346, 49 So. 2d 423 (1950).
5. 8 La. 489 (1835).
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was not precluded from bringing the action because of Article
1660.
Having weighed the evidence in the Succession of Evans,6
the court found decedent's second marriage valid and the issue
therefrom legitimate. Thus, the two daughters of the second
marriage shared equally with the daughter of the first marriage
in their father's estate.
In Succession of Pizzati7 the olographic will of Mrs. Toro was
attacked by her brother on four counts. The evidence did not
support the pleas of forgery and duress, nor was there sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of mental capacity at the time
the will was written, though the testatrix was later suffering
from senile dementia, which may have been in its early stages
at the date of the will. The plea which necessarily gave the court
difficulty was under Articles 1489 and 1491, since the testatrix had
left her entire estate to the minor son of her friend and physician.
Our courts had not previously been called upon to determine what
constitutes the "illness of which [a donor] dies" during which
period the attending physician may not receive a gift from the
sick person. The testatrix died of pneumonia induced by disabili-
ties attendant to arteriosclerosis and associated difficulties. French
authorities were consulted and while they were not in entire
agreement, there was a consensus that the illness designated by
the prohibitory article was only the "final painful period" in the
case of a progressive disease like tuberculosis or cancer. This idea
was adopted by our court with the safeguard that "all cases of this
nature must be decided on their own facts and circumstances."
Since the father of the legatee had not attended the testatrix dur-
ing the prohibited period, the child was not a person interposed
and so could receive the legacy. The father of the minor was
properly appointed testamentary executor under Articles 1042,
1665, 1044, 883 and 977.
In Barnsdall Oil Company v. Applegate9 a tacit acceptance
by certain heirs of the estate of their father was found because
they had mortgaged the property. Justice McCaleb .dissented on
this point, as he was not convinced by the evidence that the mort-
gagors knew the property to be that of their father and uncondi-
tionally accepted it with intent to bear burdens as well as receive
6. 218 La. 397, 49 So. 2d 738 (1950).
7. 218 La. 549, 50 So. 2d 189 (1950).
8. 218 La. 549, 570, 50 So. 2d 189, 196 (1950).
9. 218 La. 572, 50 So. 2d 197 (1950).
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benefits at the time of the mortgage. Acceptance having been
found by some of the heirs, however, during the thirty year period
prescribed by Article 1030, the other heirs were held to have lost
their right by failure to accept during this period.
In Demoruelle v. Allen ° the court held that a community,
like a succession, was an "ideal being" and that a partition sued
for concurrently with a plea for divorce should be within the
jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce regardless of the
situation of the property. In a concurring opinion it was indicated
that if partition of community was not requested in the proceed-
ing for separation of bed and board or divorce, the rule of situs,
as in ordinary suits, might prevail as is true after a succession is
closed and heirs become mere co-owners.
On first hearing in Succession of Dupre" a transfer of land
was found to have been a dation en paiement to which the articles
governing donations did not apply. On the second hearing Article
2480 was examined and, since usufruct had been reserved, the
parties were put to their proof as to the reality of the transaction
in order that the presumption of simulation might be overcome.
Proof of a debt for services rendered having failed, the court
found the transaction to have been a donation in disguise, made
to an interposed person under the prohibition of Articles 1481
and 1491. To the argument that only forced heirs might attack
the donation under Article 2239, the court found the exception
of public policy which made it possible for parties interested, as
collateral heirs, to show the transfer as a nullity and an attempted
fraud upon the law.
In Key v. Salley" the court held a judgment of court placing
a widow and heir in possession of decedent's property with reser-
vation to the widow of administration and claim for allowance in
necessity an absolute nullity under Article 986 prohibiting con-
ditional acceptances or renunciations of successions. Thus, the
lower court had jurisdiction of administrative proceedings and
could properly order sales of the succession property. Purchasers
were not bound to look beyond the court's order and received
good titles.
In Fontenot v. Vidrine13 a wife in community left the usufruct
of her property to her husband, who inherited'the naked owner-
10. 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950).
11. 218 La. 907, 51 So. 2d 317 (1950) (rehearing 1951).
12. 218 La. 922, 51 So. 2d 390 (1951).
13. 218 La. 979, 51 So. 2d 597 (1951).
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ship under the rule of Article 915, in effect at the wife's death.
The fact that the husband had not had himself put into possession
preceding his death did not estop his collateral heirs from claim-
ing to the exclusion of her collateral heirs.
In Fried v. Bradley14 executors of the will of decedent, domi-
ciled in Mississippi, sold land in Louisiana without compliance
with any Louisiana safeguards or procedures. After ten years
this sale was attacked by the heirs. It was held that the sale was
an absolute nullity but subject to the prescription of Article 2221,
since the transfer was not "in derogation of public order and
good morals." On rehearing, the majority of the court found
further that, since the matter of the wife's half of this community
property sold in its entirety by the executors of the husband's
succession had not been raised in the trial court, the issue was
not properly before the supreme court. In concurring opinions
Justices Fournet and McCaleb differed with the majority on the
propriety of the court's considering the issue. However, Chief
Justice Fournet believed this claim also to be barred by lack of
right to attack after ten years under theory of tacit ratification.
Justice McCaleb believed the claim barred by Article 2221 and
ratification by acceptance of the proceeds of the sale, and further
that the defendants had acquired the land under good faith
acquirendi prescription after the defect of form had been cured
by failure of the heirs to enter their claim within the first ten
year period under 2221.
The case of Sun Oil Company v. Tarver,15 second16 in this
resum6 to consider Article 1030, is of particular interest because
after a great deal of jurisprudence and comment was reviewed,
the "predicate" of Generes v. Bowie Lumber Company1 7 was
rejected as incorrect. In that case the court found that an heir
will lose in thirty years that which he has; and hence, since a
regular heir is seized of the succession upon the instant of
death of his relative, he loses the right to renounce. The corol-
lary, of course, is that the irregular heir, having but a right to
claim or accept, loses this right after thirty years. The instant
case finds this theory incompatible with the provision that no one
can be forced to accept a succession1 8 and with the "suspension"
of the application of the doctrine of le mort saisit le vif until the
14. 219 La. 59, 52 So. 2d 247 (1950) (rehearing 1951).
15. 219 La. 103, 52 So. 2d 437 (1951).
16. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Applegate, 218 La. 572, 50 So. 2d 197 (1950).
17. 143 La. 811, 79 So. 413 (1918).
18. Art. 977, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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regular heir decides whether he will accept or renounce. 19 Thus,
the doctrine of Tillery v. Fuller,20 clearly in conflict with the
reasoning of the Generes case, was maintained; and the claim of
regular heirs who had not accepted during the thirty years was
rejected since co-heirs during the period had accepted. It would
appear that from a presumption of acceptance after thirty years
or loss of the right to renounce the reverse rule is now announced
of loss of right to accept. The court states that the simple mean-
ing of 1030 is that of loss of "the right of election or choice to do
one of two things," yet as applied the loss is not of one but of
both things as, being unable to accept, certainly renunciation
becomes unnecessary. However, it is indicated that if some co-
heirs have recognized the inheritance as not having vested fully
in themselves but in part in other co-heirs, then the latter might
be held to have accepted after thirty years. What happens if no
one does anything for thirty years was not at issue and is not
outlined. Where the title to the part of one heir is, after another
has accepted, until thirty years have passed is another puzzling
question.
The article 2 1 stating that acceptance is presumed until renun-
ciation, which must be expressly22 made, is not discussed. The
article dealing with suspension 2' would seem to indicate that the
heirs' right to accept, renounce, or accept with benefit of inven-
tory is in suspense, not his acquisition of the estate, which may
only be defeated by his renunciation. The origin of the harsh
doctrine of barring regular heirs after thirty years in cases
where co-heirs have accepted is obscure since it does not appear
to be announced in the code. Article 1031 permits heirs to accept
after having renounced if other heirs have not accepted in the
interim. It may be that the original dicta in the jurisprudence
referred to this situation and was later picked up and evolved
into doctrine without referenc to 1031.
In Girven v. Miller24 an attack on grounds of prohibited sub-
stitution and fidei commissum and reference to another docu-
ment not in olographic form was made on the following will:
"New Orleans, La: Jan. 3, 1946. This is my will. I leave all I
die possessed of to Rev. William A. Miller, CSSR. to be dis-
19. Art. 946, La. Civil Code of 1870.
20. 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
21. Art. 1014, La. Civil Code of 1870.
22. Art. 1017, La. Civil Code of 1870.
23. Art. 946, La. Civil Code of 1870.
24. 219 La. 252, 52 So. 2d 843 (1951).
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posed and administered according to my typed instructions,
and I name Father William A. Miller, CSSR., Executor of my
estate with full seizin and without bond. (Signed) Joseph A.
Girven CSSR."
The majority of the court found the will valid as having def-
initely vested full title in the legatee under the initial words of
the testator. The further statement might be regarded as not
written under the directive of Article 1519, or considered as
merely precatory. Thus, the typewritten material was unimpor-
tant as the legatee was bound only in conscience to follow the
wishes of the testator. Two dissents were registered, one with
opinion, where the strong point was made that the typewritten
instructions had to be considered in order to determine whether
the statement in the will constituted a prohibited bequest or not,
thus making the form of the will invalid. Furthermore, the inten-
tion of the testator was defeated instead of being fulfilled, as
indicated by the majority, since the typewritten material showed
a desire that a brother should benefit.
In Succession of Francke25 an opposition to the homologation
of a final account by a testamentary executor was filed. A claim
for personal services to the deceased, performed by a daughter,
was examined with a view to establishing its value on a quantum
meruit basis. A three year period of nursing services, in con-
nection with cancer of the rectum, was proved. During this
period the daughter also took care of the house, prepared the
food, washed clothes, carried wood, et cetera. Two hundred and
ten dollars per month was allowed. The author of the majority
opinion stated the rule to have been settled that a child of a
parent not "in a penurious condition" could not receive compensa-
tion for services unless there had been "an express or implied
promise to pay" by the parent. Justice LeBlanc, while concur-
ring in the decree, registered his continued disagreement with
the holding in Muse v. Muse,26 relied upon in the majority opinion.
In Kranz's Succession v. Wetmore 2T a testator after making
specific bequests stated that he wanted certain movables sold and
"such money added to the remainder of my estate and to be dis-
tributed to Charity." Obviously, this attempted bequest fell under
the language of 1573 of the code and the undisposed remainder
went to his sole legal heir, a sister, regardless of what his inten-
25. 219 La. 288, 52 So. 2d 855 (1951).
26. 215 La. 238, 40 So. 2d 21 (1949).
27. 219 La. 450, 53 So. 2d 230 (1951).
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tion may have been. A certain ring was mentioned in an undated
codicil as having been intended by the wife of the testator for a
previously deceased person. On several counts this bequest also
failed.
Succession of Schmidt 28 registers an attack on the mental
capacity of a testator. The rule of presumption of capacity was
reiterated and the proof found to be insufficient to overcome this
presumption. Succession of Lanata29 was cited for the proposi-
tion that even "interdiction, standing alone, would not ipso facto
incapacitate the interdict from making a will, but would only
have been evidence of her incapacity, to be considered with all
the other evidence."
TORTS
Dale E. Bennett*
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The res ipsa loquitur exception to the general rule, that the
plaintiff must establish the fact of defendant's negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence, has been applied by our Louisi-
ana courts to a wide variety of situations.' In Allen v. Shreve-
port Theatre Corporation2 the plaintiff (theatre patron) was suing
for injuries sustained when the theatre ceiling fell during a per-
formance. In Mayerhefer v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Com-
pany3 the doctrine was applied to another of the innumerable
bottling cases.4 The plaintiff's cause of action arose out of the
drinking of a bottle of Coca-Cola that contained a harmful quan-
tity of free iodine.
Both of these cases squarely met the requirements of the doc-
trine. First, the accidents occurred under circumstances where
common experience strongly suggested negligence. Secondly,
the instrumentality (theatre) or process (bottling) causing the
28. 219 La. 675, 53 So. 2d 834 (1951).
29. 205 La. 915, 18 So. 2d 500 (1944).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. For a complete analysis of this problem, see Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur
and Proof by Inference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 70 (1941).
2. 218 La. 11008, 51 So. 2d 607 (1951).
3. 219 La. 320, 52 So. 2d 866 (1951).
4. For a summary of this group of cases, see Note, 4 LOUISIANA LAW
REviw 606 (1942).
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